1. Field of the Invention
The present invention relates in general to a server-side implementation of a cryptographic system and in particular to a cryptographic server providing cryptographic functionality transparently between applications requesting differing cryptographic algorithms or standards.
2. Description of the Related Art
In today's society, individuals and businesses conduct an ever-increasing amount of activities on and over computer systems. These computer systems, including proprietary and non-proprietary computer networks, are often storing, archiving, and transmitting all types of sensitive information. Thus, an ever-increasing need exists for ensuring data stored and transmitted over these systems cannot be read or otherwise compromised.
One common solution for securing computer systems is to provide login and password functionality. However, password management has proven to be quite costly with a large percentage of help desk calls relating to password issues. Moreover, passwords provide little security in that they are generally stored in a file susceptible to inappropriate access, through, for example, brute-force attacks.
Another solution for securing computer systems is to provide cryptographic infrastructures. Cryptography, in general, refers to protecting data by transforming, or encrypting, it into an unreadable format. Only those who possess the key(s) to the encryption can decrypt the data into a useable format. Cryptography is used to identify users, e.g., authentication, to allow access privileges, e.g., authorization, to create digital certificates and signatures, and the like. One popular cryptography system is a public-key system that uses two keys, a public key known to everyone and a private key known only to the individual or business owner thereof. Generally, the data encrypted with one key is decrypted with the other and neither key is recreatable from the other.
Unfortunately, even the foregoing typical public-key cryptographic systems are still highly reliant on the user for security. For example, cryptographic systems issue the private key to the user, for example, through the user's browser. Unsophisticated users then generally store the private key on a hard drive accessible to others through an open computer system, such as, for example, the Internet. On the other hand, users may choose poor names for files containing their private key, such as, for example, “key.” The result of the foregoing and other acts is to allow the key or keys to be susceptible to compromise.
In addition to the foregoing compromises, typical public-key cryptographic systems lack interoperability between differing requesting applications. For example, when a user of a first system wants to engage in cryptographic events with a user of a second system, typical public-key cryptographic systems mandate that the first and second systems employ the same cryptographic algorithms, keys, standards, certificate types and issuers, protocols, and the like. Thus, typical public-key cryptographic systems are often limited in the type and number of applications or systems the typical public-key cryptographic system can service.
Moreover, typical public-key cryptographic systems often generate numerous keys for each user due to continual theft, damage, loss, or the like, by the user. For example, the mobile user employing a smartcard, laptop, mobile phone, or the like, may lose or break the smartcard or portable computing device, thereby having his or her access to potentially important data entirely cut-off. Alternatively, a malicious person may steal the mobile user's smartcard or portable computing device and use it to effectively steal the mobile user's digital credentials. On the other hand, the portable-computing device may be connected to an open system, such as the Internet, and, like passwords, the file where the biometric is stored may be susceptible to compromise through user inattentiveness to security or malicious intruders.